The key objective of database systems is to reliably manage data, whereby high query throughput and low query latency are core requirements. To satisfy these requirements, database systems constantly adapt to novel hardware features. Although it has been intensively studied and commonly accepted that hardware error rates in terms of bit flips increase dramatically with the decrease of the underlying chip structures, most database system research activities neglected this fact, leaving error (bit flip) detection as well as correction to the underlying hardware. Especially for memory, silent data corruption (SDC) as a result of transient bit flips leading to faulty data is mainly detected and corrected at the DRAM and memory-controller layer. However, since future hardware becomes less reliable and error detection as well as correction by hardware becomes more expensive, this free ride will come to an end in the near future. To further provide a reliable data management, an emerging research direction will be employing specific and tailored protection techniques at the database system level. Following that, we are currently developing and implementing an adopted system design for state-of-the-art in-memory column stores. In this position paper, we summarize our vision, the current state and outline future work of our research.
INTRODUCTION
We have already known for a long time that hardware components are not perfect and soft errors in terms of single bit flips happen all the time (transient bit flips). Up to now, hardware-based protection is used to mitigate these single bit flips. However, recent studies have shown that future hardware is becoming less and less reliable and the occurrence of multibit flips instead of single bit flips is prevailing Rehman et al., 2016; Henkel et al., 2013; Shafique et al., 2015) . For example, repeatedly accessing one memory cell in DRAM modules causes bit flips in physically-adjacent memory cells, whereby one to four bits flips per 64-bit word have been discovered Mutlu, 2017) . The reason for this is a hardware failure mechanism called disturbance error Mutlu, 2017) . In this case, electromagnetic (cell-to-cell) interference leads to bit flips and it is already known that this interference effect increases with smaller feature sizes and higher densities of transistors Mutlu, 2017) . Furthermore, emerging non-volatile memory technologies like PCM (phase change memory) (Lee et al., 2009) , STT-MRAM (Kultursay et al., 2013) , and PRAM (Wong et al., 2012) exhibit similar and perhaps even more reliability issues (Khan et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2013; Mutlu, 2017) . For instance, heat produced by writing one PCM cell can alter the value stored in many nearby cells (e.g., up to 11 cells in a 64 byte-block). Additionally, hardware aging effects will lead to changing bit flip rates at run-time (Henkel et al., 2013) .
Generally, all hardware components in the nano transistor era will show an increasing unreliability behavior (Borkar, 2005; Henkel et al., 2013; Rehman et al., 2016) , but memory cells are more susceptible than logic gates (Henkel et al., 2013; Hwang et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2007) . To tackle the upcoming increasing reliability concerns, there exist a lot of hardware-oriented research activities (Borkar, 2005; Henkel et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2007) . However, these activities show that hardware-based approaches are very effective on the one hand, but the protection is very challenging and each technique introduces large performance, chip area, and power overheads on the other hand (Henkel et al., 2013; Rehman et al., 2016; Shafique et al., 2015) . Furthermore, the protection techniques have to be implemented in a pessimistic way to cover the aging aspect leading usually to an over-provisioning. The whole is made more difficult by Dark Silicon (Esmaeilzadeh et al., 2012) : billions of transistors can be put on a chip, but not all them can be used at the same time. This and the various new disruptive hardware interference effects make the reliable hardware design and development very challenging, time consuming, and very expensive (Rehman et al., 2016) . The disadvantages outweigh the advantages for hardware-based protection, so that the semiconductor as well as hardware/software communities have recently experienced a shift towards mitigating these reliability issues also at higher software layers, rather than completely mitigating these issues only in hardware (Henkel et al., 2013; Rehman et al., 2016; Shafique et al., 2015) .
Consequently, this shift will also affects database systems, because data as well as query processing have to be protected in software accordingly to further guarantee a reliable data management on future unreliable hardware. Unfortunately, classical softwarebased protection techniques are usually based on data/code redundancy using dual or triple modular redundancy (DMR/TMR). While DMR only allows error detection, TMR can also correct errors (Pittelli and Garcia-Molina, 1986; Pittelli and Garcia-Molina, 1989) . However, the application of these techniques with respect to in-memory database systems causes a high overhead (Pittelli and Garcia-Molina, 1986; Pittelli and Garcia-Molina, 1989) . For example, DMR protection requires twice as much memory capacity compared to a normal (unprotected) setting, since data must be kept twice in different main memory locations. Furthermore, every query is redundantly executed with an additional voting at the end resulting in a computational overhead slightly higher than 2x. Thus, there is a clear need for database-specific protection approaches without sacrificing the overall performance too much (Böhm et al., 2011) . To tackle that grand challenge, we present our overall vision and summarize first promising results in this paper. In detail, we make the following contributions: 1. We describe our big picture by introducing our assumptions and based on that three requirements for database-specific approaches (Section 2). 2. While Section 3 summarizes our novel developed error detection approach (Kolditz et al., 2018) , Section 4 outlines our vision or research activities for error correction. Finally, we close the paper with related work in Section 5 and a short conclusion in Section 6.
OVERALL VISION
In principle, any undetected and uncorrected bit flip destroys the reliability objective of database systems in form of false negatives (missing tuples), false posi- tives (tuples with invalid predicates) or inaccurate aggregates in a silent way. So far, database systems do not care about this reliability aspect because hardware components usually provide appropriate protection techniques. However, this free-ride will come to an end in the near future (Borkar, 2005; Henkel et al., 2013; Rehman et al., 2016) . To prepare stateof-the-art in-memory database systems by developing appropriate approaches, we assume in our work as illustrated in Figure 1 that (i) all hardware components are unreliable, (ii) multi-bit flips will occur regularly rather than exceptionally, and (iii) bit flips are not handled at the hardware layer. Furthermore, the bit flip rate changes at runtime due to various effects like heat (Henkel et al., 2013) . Based on these assumptions, major challenges for in-memory database system are reliable data storage as well as reliable query processing (Böhm et al., 2011) . To provide both reliability issues, we envision to tightly integrate protection techniques in inmemory database systems and to use the available database knowledge to specialize as well as to balance protection and the associated overhead. That means, our goal is to develop an appropriate solution satisfying the following requirements based on our assumptions: (R1). Our solution has to detect as well as to correct (i) errors (multi-bit flips) that modify data stored in main memory, (ii) errors induced during transferring on interconnects, and (iii) errors induced during computations during query processing (detection capability). (R2). Our solution has to be adaptable to different error model at runtime because the number and the rate of bit flips may vary over hardware generations or due to hardware aging effects (run-time adaptability). (R3). Our solution has to introduce only the necessary overhead in terms of memory consumption and query runtime being required to protect against a desired error model. That means, the overhead should be as small as possible, but still provide a reliable behavior (balanced overhead).
In our work, we mainly focus on state-of-the-art in-memory columns stores (Abadi et al., 2013; Idreos et al., 2012; Stonebraker et al., 2005) and our envisioned reliable architecture is depicted in Figure 1 . As illustrated, we explicitly distinguish between error detection and error correction on the one hand. On the other hand, we have to consider the storage as well as processing layer of column stores. From our point of view, the most important part is error detection, because it is the prerequisite for error correction. If we are not able to detect bit flips, no correction can be triggered. Thus, we developed a novel approach for error detection tailored for in-memory column stores as summarized in the next section. In the following, we want to extend this approach with error correction capabilities.
ERROR DETECTION
For error detection, we developed a novel column store-specific approach called AHEAD (Kolditz et al., 2018) which is mainly based on error coding, but we are not using a well-known error code like Hamming (Hamming, 1950; Moon, 2005) . However, our approach has unique properties as shown later. That means, we encode all data and data structures in way that we are able to detect bit flips in base data as well as during query processing. To represent the intention of error detection, we introduce new terms for encoding and decoding. We denote the encoding of data as data hardening, since data is literally firmed so that corruption becomes detectable. In contrast, we denote as data softening the decoding of data, as it becomes vulnerable to corruption again.
Generally, in-memory column stores maintain relational data using the decomposition storage model (DSM) (Copeland and Khoshafian, 1985) , where each column of a table is separately stored as a fixed-width dense array (Abadi et al., 2013) . To reconstruct the tuples of a table, each column record is stored in the same (array) position across all columns of a table (Abadi et al., 2013) . Column stores typically support a fixed set of basic data types, including integers, decimal (fixed-, or floating-point) numbers, and strings. For fixed-width data types (e.g., integer, decimal and floating-point), column stores utilize basic arrays of the respective type for the values of a column (Abadi et al., 2013; Idreos et al., 2012) . For variable-width data types (e.g., strings), some kind of dictionary encoding is applied to transform them into fixed-width columns (Abadi et al., 2013; Abadi et al., 2006; Binnig et al., 2009 ). The simplest form constructs a dictionary for an entire column sorted on frequency, and represents values as integer positions in this dictionary (Abadi et al., 2013) . That means, in-memory column stores are based on two main data structures as illustrated in Figure 1 : (i) dictionaries for variable-length data types and (ii) column arrays for fixed-length data types. Thus, each base table column is stored either by means of a single data array or by a combination of a dictionary and a data array containing fixed-width integer references to the dictionary. The decision is made based on the data type of the column. Therefore, we have to harden both structures.
Hardened Data Arrays
For data arrays, we only have to harden values and this is done using AN coding (Avizienis, 1971; Hoffmann et al., 2014) as illustrated in Figure 2 . AN coding is a representative of arithmetic error detecting codes, where the hardened code words are computed by multiplying a constant integer value A onto each original data word. The multiplication modifies the data word itself and all data is viewed as integers as shown in Figure 2 . As a result of this multiplication, the domain of code words expands such that only multiples of A become valid code words, and all other integers are considered non-code words. The used value of A has an impact on the detection capability as described later. For softening, A division or multiplication of the inverse of A is required. Bit flips are detected by testing the remainder of this operation, which must be zero, otherwise the code word was corrupted. A unique feature of arithmetic codes, and thus AN coding, is the ability to operate directly on hardened data by encoding the other operands, too (Avizienis, 1971; Hoffmann et al., 2014) .
Different Data Types
Regarding hardening arrays of integer data, this requires only multiplication with a constant factor of A. For decimal numbers, the case is a bit more complex: for the sake of correctness and accuracy, database sys-tems typically use fixed-point numbers and arithmetic instead of native floating point numbers (float / double) (Neumann, 2016) . These fixed-point numbers are usually represented as integer (Neumann, 2016) , which can be hardened like integers. 
Parametrization of AN Coding
As mentioned above, AN coding has only one parameter A which has an impact on the error detection rate as well as the necessary storage overhead. Now, to reliably detect b bit flips in each code word, a value for A has to be used which guarantees a minimum Hamming distance of b + 1, whereby A depends on the data bit width l and on the number of detectable bit flips (Avizienis, 1971; Hoffmann et al., 2014) . Moreover, to reduce the necessary space overhead, it is usually not some arbitrary value for A sought but a small one (called "super A"), so that the domain of code words is small. We applied a brute force approach to compute "super As" for different settings of l and b, whereby the brute force approach consists of two components: Component 1: Determine minimum Hamming distance for a given A and l, and Component 2: Iterate over all possible As to determine a small A with a minimum Hamming distance of b + 1, whereby component 1 is heavily applied. Table 1 lists an extract of computed "super As". For example, for 8-bit data and a minimum bit flip weight of two, we have to use A=29 for the hardening. As depicted, we require five additional bits for the hardening. If we want to increase the minimum bit flip weight to 3, we only have to use A=233 resulting in a code word width of 16. In this case, the data overhead increases from 62, 5% (13 bit code word width) to 100% (16 bit code word width for 8 bit data).
Based on that, we are able to use this knowledge for a balanced data hardening with regard to a specific hardware error model (number of bit flips) and to specific data characteristics (data bit width). Additionally, column data arrays can be re-hardened at runtime with different As. Thus, the requirements (R2) and (R3) are adequately addressed from the storage perspective. Nevertheless, Table 1 also highlights that the brute force approach for the computation of A is very expensive, because we are currently not able to compute a value for A for all settings of l and b. Thus, a new approach have to be developed for this computation.
Hardened Dictionaries
Dictionaries are usually realized using index structures to efficiently support encoding and decoding (Binnig et al., 2009) . In contrast to data arrays, not only the data values must be hardened, but also necessary pointers within the index structures. To tackle that issue, Kolditz et al. (Kolditz et al., 2014) already proposed various techniques to harden B-Trees, which we are currently using in our approach. As they have shown, hardening pointer-intensive structures are more challenging as hardening data arrays. However, slightly increasing data redundancy at the right places by incorporating context knowledge increases error detection significantly (Kolditz et al., 2014) . Moreover, for dictionaries of integer data, AN hardening can be applied on the dictionary entries. The corresponding column (data array) contains fixed-width, AN hardened integer references to the dictionary.
Continuous Error Detection
To satisfy requirement (R1), we integrated bit flip detection into each and every physical query operator by checking each value. From our point of view, this is the best solution, because bit flips caused by any hardware components are continuously detected. Moreover, each and every value is checked for bit flips in the columns of base tables and intermediate results. The integration can be seamlessly done for both state-of-the-art processing models of columnat-a-time (Abadi et al., 2013; Idreos et al., 2012) and vector-at-a-time (Zukowski et al., 2012) with our hardened storage concept. There are two reasons: (i) the column structure is unchanged, only the data width is increased and (ii) the values are multiplied by A and can thus be processed as before.
We also fully implemented our error detection approach and conducted an experimental evaluation using the SSB benchmark (O'Neil et al., 2009) . In our evaluation, we compared our approach with the Unprotected baseline and dual modular redundancy (DMR). In the Unprotected baseline, data is always compressed on a byte-level based on the column characteristics. DMR uses the Unprotected setting and replicates all data in main memory, executes each query twice sequentially, and afterwards a voter compares both results. Our approach hardens each column using the largest currently known A for the corresponding column data width from Table 1 . Thus, compared to Unprotected setting, our approach increases the data width of each column to the next byte level. For all approaches, we measured all 13 SSB queries for vectorized (Intel SSE4.2) execution and we varied the SSB scale factor from 1 to 10. Each single experiment ran 10 times. Figure 3 shows vectorized (SSE4.2) runtimes relative to the Unprotected baseline. On the one hand, DMR results in the expected runtime overhead of about 100%, because each query is executed twice. On the other hand, the runtime overhead of our approach is only between 7% to 28%. This is due to the tight integration of error detection in each operator combined with our AN coding approach.
Future Work
Our future work in this direction is manifold, whereby three aspects are very important: (i) develop new approach for the computation of the parameter value A, (ii) investigate the interplay of data compression and data hardening, and (iii) develop appropriate techniques to protect internal query operator data structures like hash maps. For instance, the second aspects is crucial, because in-memory column stores heavily employ lightweight data compression to reduce the necessary memory space and to address the access bottleneck between main memory and CPU (Abadi et al., 2006; Damme et al., 2017; Zukowski et al., 2006) . While both domains are orthogonal to each other, their interplay is very important to keep the overall memory footprint of the data as low as possible (Kolditz et al., 2015) . With data hardening, compression gains even more significance, since it can reduce the newly introduced storage overhead. However, combining both is challenging and we briefly outline some aspects requiring closer investigation. Fitness of Compression Algorithms. There is a high number of lightweight data compression algorithms (Abadi et al., 2006; Damme et al., 2017; Zukowski et al., 2006) , which differ in how far they are suited for the combination with AN-coding. Order of Hardening and Compression. Hardening could be applied to compressed data, or vice-versa. The decision depends on the compression algorithm: While dictionary coding (Abadi et al., 2006 ) must be applied before hardening to obtain integers from variable-width data, null suppression (Abadi et al., 2006; Damme et al., 2017; Lemire and Boytsov, 2015; Zukowski et al., 2006 ) could be applied before or after. Hardened Compression Meta Data.
Most lightweight compression algorithms store some meta data along with the compressed data to enable decompression. If hardening comes before compression, the latter must harden the meta data on its own. For instance, with run length encoding (Abadi et al., 2006; Damme et al., 2017) of hardened data, the run values will already be hardended, while the run lengths as meta data still need to be hardened. Detection and Re-encoding vs. Decompression. Detection and re-encoding happen many times per query. Conversely, decompression can often be delayed until the end of the query, since many operators can process compressed data directly (Abadi et al., 2013; Zukowski et al., 2006) . Hence, detection and re-encoding should not require decompression.
ERROR CORRECTION
Up to now, we only considered error detection. As next, we want to extend our approach with the ability of continuous error correction. In this case, detected bit flips should be on-the-fly corrected during query processing. At the moment, we are already able to detect bit flips on value granularity and can find out where the error occurred. Based on that property, we believe that specific correction techniques can be developed and integrated in the query processing. For example, if we detect a faulty code word in the input of an operator, we can re-transmit this value, possibly several times, to correct errors induced during transmission. If we get a valid code word, processing can continue with this correct code word. If we get an invalid code word, we can assume that bits are flipped in main memory and then we require an appropriate technique for error correction. For that, correcting bit flips in memory requires data redundancy in any case.
Here, classical RAID-techniques or techniques from the network coding domain like linear combinations may be interesting to consult. In particular, a very promising idea from our perspective is to use linear combinations of hardened data columns array as illustrated in Figure 4 for the error correction. In this example, a single redundant column Z is created as a linear combination of two columns X and Y . As depicted, the columns X and Y can be appropriately reconstructed for correction, whereby the reconstruction is possible on a value granularity. Fundamentally, AN coding and linear combinations perfectly fit together and they require less space overhead than triple modular redundancy. Furthermore, the redundant data in form of linear combinations are automatically hardened at the same time, so that these data can be checked for bit flips. Main research questions are: 1. Which linear combinations should be created at all? 2. How can queries be answered on these linear combinations? 3. What does an efficient access to these linear combinations for value-based correction look like?
RELATED WORK
Fundamentally, hardware components fabricated with nano-scale transistors face serious reliability issues like soft errors, aging, thermal hot spots, and process variations as a consequence of the aggressive transistor miniaturization (Rehman et al., 2016) . Additionally, memory cells are more susceptible to soft errors than logic gates (Henkel et al., 2013; Hwang et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2007) . These issues arise from multiple sources and they jeopardize the correct application execution (Rehman et al., 2016) . The recently published book (Rehman et al., 2016) summarizes state-of-the-art protection techniques in all hardware as well as software layers and presents new results of a large research initiative.
Hardware-Level Protection. Hardware protection to mitigate soft errors can be done on three layers (Rehman et al., 2016) : (i) transistor, (ii) circuit, and (iii) architectural. On the transistor layer, several techniques have been proposed to harden transistors against radiation events like alpha particles or neutron strikes (Itoh et al., 1980; Kohara et al., 1990) . For example, thick polyimide can be used for alpha particle protection (Itoh et al., 1980; Kohara et al., 1990) . However, this technique cannot be utilized for neutron strikes (Rehman et al., 2016) . In general, techniques at this layer have in common that the protection results in adopted fabrication processes using specialized materials (Itoh et al., 1980; Kohara et al., 1990; Rehman et al., 2016) . Therefore, these techniques are very effective, but they produce (i) substantial overhead in terms of area and cost, and (ii) immense validation and verification costs. At the circuit layer, redundant circuits and error detection/correction circuits are prominent examples (Dell, 1997; Ernst et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2007; Rehman et al., 2016) . For instance, the RAZOR approach introduces shadow flip flops in the pipeline to recover from errors in logic gates (Ernst et al., 2004) . Memories and caches are usually protected using error correcting codes (ECC) or parity techniques. Current ECC memories are based on Hamming using a (72,64) code, meaning that 64 bits of data are enhanced with 8 bits of parity allowing single error correction and double error detection. To address multi bit flips advanced ECC schemes have to be used. Examples are (i) IBM's Chipkill approach, which computes the parity bits from different memory words and even separate DIMMs instead of physically adjacent bits (Dell, 1997) , and (ii) (Kim et al., 2007) , which shows that other ECC codes like BCH-codes (Moon, 2005) can be realized in hardware. However, this increases the number of transistors in hardware and consequently impacts the energy demand, the overhead growing quickly as the code strength is increased (Kim et al., 2007) . Additionally, reading and computing the enhanced ECC bits can be a performance bottleneck during read operations (Kim et al., 2007) .
At the architectural layer, the protection is based upon the redundant execution either in space (using duplicated hardware units) or in time (using the same hardware multiple times for redundant execution and comparing the results). Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) are traditional approaches. Generally, these techniques lead to an increased power usage which may potentially increase the temperature (Rehman et al., 2016) . Increased temperatures lead to higher soft error rate and increased aging (Rehman et al., 2016) .
To summarize, hardware-based protection has been proposed at different layers. The techniques are usually very effective, but they also have some drawbacks in terms of (i) high chip area overhead leading at the same time to more power overhead and (ii) performance penalties. Furthermore, the high verification/validation costs make the reliable hardware design and development very expensive and time consuming (Rehman et al., 2016) . To overcome these non-negligible drawbacks, a rich set of softwarebased techniques has evolved.
Software-Level Protection. Classical softwarebased protection techniques are (Goloubeva et al., 2006; Rehman et al., 2016) : (i) N-version programming, (ii) code redundancy, (iii) control flow checking, and (iv) checkpoint recovery. For instance, N-version programming (Avizienis, 1985) is based on implementing multiple program versions of the same specification which reduces the probability of identical errors occurring in two or more versions. State-of-the-art redundancy-based techniques are Error Detection using Duplicated Instructions (EDDI) (Oh et al., 2002) and Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SWIFT) (Reis et al., 2005) . Both provide software reliability by duplicating instructions, and inserting comparison and checking instructions. However, these techniques incur significant performance overheads (Oh et al., 2002; Reis et al., 2005) .
Moreover, AN coding has also been used for software-based fault tolerance (Hoffmann et al., 2014; Schiffel, 2011; Ulbrich et al., 2012) . For instance, the work of Schiffel (Schiffel, 2011) allows to encode existing software binaries or to add encoding at compile time, where not all variables' states need to be known in advance. However, in her work she only describes encoding integers of size |D| ∈ {1, 8, 16, 32} bits and pointers, where the encoded values are always 64 bits large. Furthermore, protecting processors by AN coding was also suggested in (Forin, 1989) .
CONCLUSION
A few years ago, Boehm et al. (Böhm et al., 2011) pointed out the lack of data management techniques dealing with an increasing number of bit flips in main memory as a more and more relevant source of errors. Thus, we presented our overall vision for a reliable data management on unreliable hardware in this position paper, because recent studies show that future hardware becomes less reliable. In particular, we summarized our novel develop error detection approach, which is the first comprehensive databasespecific approach to tackle a reliable data management on unreliable hardware.
